Suchergebnisse

We measure the impact of the Farmers Income Diversification Program (FIDP), an EU funded program implemented in Malawi from late 2005 onwards, aiming at increasing agricultural productivity, diversification, value addition, commercialization and trade of subsistence farmers. The geographical spread of the implementation of FIDP is exploited to identify its impact. Computations are based on annual data by Extension Planning Area, 198 in total, fully covering Malawi, for the period 2003-04 to 2009-10. The estimations support a statistically significant impact of FIDP on agricultural productivity, with increases reaching 20% to 24% relative to base period levels, with a lag of at least one year after the start of the program and increasing over the years. Evidence on diversification of crop income is less strong but still suggests increases ranging from 5% to 10%. Results are robust for instrumental variables, synthetic controls, clustering of standard errors and inclusion of additional covariates.

Studies dealing with the impact of public support on employment have given varying results, depending on the estimation process, sample and type of subsidy. In this paper, we investigate the impact of support from the Common Agricultural Policy and Objective 5 funds on agricultural employment changes in European regions. We use a spatial econometric approach to consider the fact that employment dynamics in one region also depend on the dynamics of its neighbors. Our conclusions raise interesting issues for the ongoing debate on the role of support to the agricultural sector and provide several policy perspectives for the new member countries where this sector still influences economic performance.

Soon after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the Bush administration announced a new national security strategy. Soon thereafter, this strategic document was denounced in European capitals as 'cowboyesk' and isolationist. Particular dislike was announced about the strategy of pre-emption in domestic affairs of other states. Under this plan Washington reserved the right to send U.S. soldiers abroad to intervene in countries before they can pose a threat to the United States. In addition, many officials in Europe rejected Washington's assertion of withdrawing from its membership in the international criminal court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol; it was perceived as a unilateralist foreign policy that rejects America's responsibility in the world. However, what some analysts and commentators neglect to see is that the Bush doctrine also shows elements of Wilsonianism, a policy named after former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who stood for promoting democracy, human rights, freedom and effective in international affairs. The European Union published their first security strategy a year after the U.S. published theirs. Interestingly, Brussels advocated similar strategies and concepts to the US strategy. Similarities can be see in both strategies in their messianic approach to create a better world and promote more international oder. This paper argues that despite the unilateralist tone of the current U.S. national security policy, the European strategy and its American counterpart share the same values of how to conduct and what to achieve in international affairs. Consequently, the two strategies can be seen as complementary to each other, not contradictory. The paper will first address the nature of the U.S. national security strategy before analyzing the European security strategy while making reference, in both cases, to the Wilsonian tradition of international affairs. Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v2i2.168

Soon after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the Bush administration announced a new national security strategy. Soon thereafter, this strategic document was denounced in European capitals as 'cowboyesk' and isolationist. Particular dislike was announced about the strategy of pre-emption in domestic affairs of other states. Under this plan Washington reserved the right to send U.S. soldiers abroad to intervene in countries before they can pose a threat to the United States. In addition, many officials in Europe rejected Washington's assertion of withdrawing from its membership in the international criminal court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol; it was perceived as a unilateralist foreign policy that rejects America's responsibility in the world. However, what some analysts and commentators neglect to see is that the Bush doctrine also shows elements of Wilsonianism, a policy named after former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who stood for promoting democracy, human rights, freedom and effective in international affairs. The European Union published their first security strategy a year after the U.S. published theirs. Interestingly, Brussels advocated similar strategies and concepts to the US strategy. Similarities can be see in both strategies in their messianic approach to create a better world and promote more international oder. This paper argues that despite the unilateralist tone of the current U.S. national security policy, the European strategy and its American counterpart share the same values of how to conduct and what to achieve in international affairs. Consequently, the two strategies can be seen as complementary to each other, not contradictory. The paper will first address the nature of the U.S. national security strategy before analyzing the European security strategy while making reference, in both cases, to the Wilsonian tradition of international affairs.

Drawing from theories of democracy, democratization and revolutions, the article examines the role of the EU in supporting democracy in Morocco in the period leading up to, during and in the immediate aftermath of the country's Arab Spring protests. It indicates that the EU did not induce reluctant elites to reform or split, did not empower social movements and civil society, and only moderately contributed to the rise of favourable modernization socio-economic conditions in the country. At the same time, certain mediating factors, such as the monarchical, Islamic and hybrid nature of the Moroccan regime, the weaknesses of the 20 February Movement and civil society, unfavourable domestic revolutionary conditions and a diminished EU leverage over Moroccan elites, further undermined the EU's ability to support democracy. Thus, the article argues that the EU's contributions in Morocco during this period do not amount to the support of deep democracy but that of polyarchy. This has broader implications as to how we understand the EU as an external democracy supporter, external democracy support, and how democracy comes about in un-democratic societies.

Democracy cannot be imposed from the outside: if it is to be sustainable, it has to come from within. External actors can at best help to support those on the ground who are pursuing the same democratic agenda. While democratisation has been one of the EU's key objectives for the Eastern Partnership region, in practice, the EU has faced many obstacles to achieving this goal. Internally, its actions have not always been coordinated, and the EU's rhetoric has not been backed up by political and financial resources. Moreover, those who hold power in the region and could therefore contribute to their countries' democratisation have rarely been interested in doing so. These constraints are unlikely to change any time soon–-but the EU can enhance the region's democratic prospects by improving its coordination and widening the scope of those it supports in the region, thereby helping to expand the circle of those who have a stake in their countries' democratisation.

Zugang zu Energie. Unterstützung von Entwicklungsländern durch die EU.